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We study how the imperfection of intensity modulator effects on the security of a practical quan-
tum key distribution system. The extinction ratio of the realistic intensity modulator is considered
in our security analysis. We show that the secret key rate increases, under the practical assumption
that the indeterminable noise introduced by the imperfect intensity modulator can not be controlled
by the eavesdropper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution(QKD) is a peculiar tech-
nology that guarantees two remote parties, Alice and
Bob, to share a secret key which is prevented from eaves-
dropping by physical laws. Since the first QKD proto-
col, namely the BB4 protocol, was proposed by Bennett
and Brassard in 1984[1], QKD has become the primary
application of quantum information science. The un-
conditional security of QKD, which is the biggest ad-
vantage of this technology, have already been proven in
both discrete-variable protocols([2–7]) and continuous-
variable protocols[8–10]. However, some assumptions in
these proofs are not removable. For instance, the single-
photon detectors(SPD) are usually considered to be un-
responsive to bright lights in the linear mode, but it is
not true. In Ref.[11], the authors experimentally prove
that the SPD click can be triggered by bright light when
the SPD is working in linear mode, therefore a detector-
blind-attack is proposed and used to hack the commercial
QKD systems successfully. For this reason, it is very im-
portant to analyze how the imperfect devices effect on
the security of a practical QKD system, and the anal-
ysis of the security in practical QKD systems attracts
much attention recently[12]. For examples, the decoy
state method proposed by Hwang[13] has developed as
a powerful tool to analyze the imperfect single-photon
source and achieve the modified secret key rate[14–16],
and the effect of imperfect phase modulator has also
be studied by an equivalent model in[17, 18]. However,
many imperfections are still not considered before. In
this paper, we analyze the finite extinction of imperfect
intensity modulator(IM) in the practical QKD system.
Our simulation result shows that surprisingly, the extra
noise introduced by the realistic IM reduces Eve’s infor-
mation and increases the secret key rate.
II. PRELIMINARY
In the BB84 protocol, Alice randomly encodes {0, 1}
into the rectilinear basis {|H〉, |V 〉} or the diagonal basis
{|+〉, |−〉}, where 〈H |V 〉 = 0 and |±〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 ± |V 〉).
She can produce these states by using the scheme de-
scribed in Figure.1, which is applicable to the high speed
FIG. 1: The scheme diagram of producing states
|H〉, |V 〉, |+〉and|−〉. LD: Laser Diode; BS: Beam Splitter; IM:
Intensity Modulator; Encoder(1-4): Polarization modulator
or Mach-Zehnder interferometer, corresponding to the proto-
col’s requirement; RPM: Random Phase Modulator. The two
couplers are used for splitting and recombing the laser pulses.
QKD systems[19].
In this scheme, the laser pulse generated by the laser
diode is first attenuated to the single photon level, which
can be written as a weak coherent state |µ〉(µ ≃ 0.2),
where µ is the amplitude of light. This state is then
split by a coupler into four paths, which are described
as a, b, c and d. After the random phase modulat-
ing and encoding, the coherent state becomes |µ〉 →
(|eiθa µ2 〉a,H + |eiθb µ2 〉b,V + |eiθc µ2 〉c,+ + |eiθd µ2 〉d,−), where
θa,b,c,d denote the additional random phases. The inten-
sity modulators(IM) are then used to filter out the com-
ponents of the state that we do not need. Depending on
the electro-optic effect, we can control the attenuation of
IM by supplying an appropriate voltage on it. The state
of IM is denoted as ”off” when it has high attenuation and
”on” when it has nearly no attenuation. The amplitude
of light is attenuated by a factor of
√
Poff or
√
Pon when
the state of IM is off or on, and the power of the output
light is Ioff = PoffI0 or Ion = PonI0 respectively, where
I0 = |µ2 |2 denotes the power of the input light. Then the
extinction ratio of IM can be defined as[20]:
r := IonIoff . (1)
For simplicity, we assume the four IM have the same ex-
tinction ratio. Without loss of generality, we suppose
that Alice produces the signal state |H〉. Note that only
the single photon state can take part in the secret key
generation[7], we consider the single photon state di-
rectly. After the 4×1 coupler, the single photon state
2FIG. 2: The equivalent model diagram of the state generation
process. OS is an optical switch that randomly routes ρideal
or ρnoise to the channel with
r−1
r+3
or 4
r+3
probability. ρideal,
ρnoise and r are defined in the text.
at the output port can be written as (see the Appendix
section for more details):
ρH = e
− (Pon+3Poff )µ
2
8 [
(Pon+3Poff )µ
2
8 ]
×( r−1r+3 |H〉〈H |+ 4r+3 Iˆ).
(2)
After normalizing, the single photon part of any signal
state produced by this modulation process can be gener-
ally written as:
ρsignal =
r−1
r+3ρideal +
4
r+3ρnoise. (3)
Where ρideal denotes the pure signal state (|H〉〈H |,
|V 〉〈V |, |+〉〈+| or |−〉〈−|), and ρnoise = 12 Î is the density
matrix of the extra noise introduced by the finite extinc-
tion ratio of IM. Figure.2 shows the equivalent model
description of the state generation process.
III. SECURITY PROOF
In this section, we prove the security of the practical
QKD system using the state generation scheme described
in Fig.1. We first analyze the security in the case of BB84
protocol with ideal single photon state, and then gener-
alize our result by combining the decoy state method.
A. BB84 protocol with single photon state
The secret key rate of BB84 protocol with ideal single
photon state can be written as[7]:
Rs = 1−H(e1)−H(e1). (4)
Where e1 is the quantum error bit rate(QBER) caused
by the noises in the channel and detectors, and H(x) =
−xlog2x−(1−x)log2(1−x) is the Shannon entropy func-
tion. In the security analysis, all of the errors are consid-
ered to be introduced by Eve when she tries to achieve
secret key information from the signal state. Equa-
tion (4) shows that a fraction H(e1) of the sifted key
is sacrificed to perform error correction, and the same
amount of information is sacrificed to perform privacy
amplification[7].
As we have analyzed in section 2, the imperfection of
IM introduce extra noises, therefore the QBER should
be modified as:
e
′
1 = e1 · r−1r+3 + 12 · 4r+3 = (1− 4r+3 )e1 + 2r+3 . (5)
The second part of the right hand side of this equation is
due to the 50% error rate introduced by ρnoise. Note
that the identity matrix remains unchanged under all
unitary operations, so that Eve can not achieve any useful
information by performing any operation on it. Therefore
this part of errors are impossible to be introduced by Eve.
For this reason, only a fraction (1− 4r+3 ) of the sifted key
need to perform the privacy amplification process[7]. We
rewrite e1 as a function of e
′
1 from Eq.(5):
e1 =
e
′
1−p
1−2p . (6)
Where p ≡ 2r+3 . The modified secret key rate can now
be written as follow:
R
′
s = 1−H(e
′
1)− (1 − 2p)H(e1)
= 1−H(e′1)− (1− 2p)H( e
′
1−p
1−2p ).
(7)
B. BB84 protocol with decoy state method
For preventing the photon number splitting(PNS) at-
tack, decoy state method is an essential tool in practical
QKD system[14, 15]. The secret key rate of the BB84
protocol with decoy state method is given by[15]:
Rd = q{−Qµf(Eµ)H(Eµ) +Q1[1−H(eU1 )]}; (8)
Qµ =
∑∞
i=0 Yie
−µ µi
i! ,
QµEµ =
∑∞
i=0Qiei.
(9)
Where q is the efficiency of the protocol which equals 12
in the BB84 protocol,
Yi is the yield of an i-photon sate,
Qµ is the gain of the signal states,
Eµ is the average QBER,
ei is the QBER caused by the i-photon state,
eU1 is the upper bound of e1,
f(x) is the bidirectional error correction efficiency as a
function of error bit rate[22]. eU1 can be estimated by[16]:
eU1 =
e0Y0+edetectη
Y0+η
. (10)
Where η is the detection efficiency of the QKD system,
e0 =
1
2 is the error bit rate caused by the vacuum state
and edetect is the error bit rate caused by the system
imperfection, which includes the error bit rate introduced
by the imperfect IM. These two parameters can both be
obtained from the field test experiments(e.g. [23]).
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FIG. 3: The simulation result of the modified secret key rate
in the case of using ideal single photon state. The modified
result in our analysis which has the maximum tolerable QBER
of 11.37% is described in blue line, comparing to the one using
the GLLP method[7], which is described in red line. In this
simulation, the extinction ratio of IM is assumed to be 27dB.
Using Eq.(6), we get the error bit rate introduced by
the ideal single photon state ρideal in Eq.(3) as:
edetect → edetect−p1−2p
eU1 →
Y0
2 +(edetect−p)η/(1−2p)
Y0+η
≡ ed1.
(11)
Using the similar method in section 3.1, we achieve the
modified secret key rate of BB84 protocol with the decoy
state method by considering the effect of IM extinction
ratio as follow:
R
′
d = q{−Qµf(Eµ)H(Eµ) +Q1(Y0+(1−2p)ηY0+η )H(ed1)}.
(12)
IV. SIMULATIONS
Fig.3 and Fig.4 show the numerical simulations of
Eq.(7) and Eq.(12) respectively. Here we assume the
extinction ratio of IM to be 500(27dB), which is a rea-
sonable value depending on the testing result of the IM
in our field test experiment[23]. In Fig.3, we simulate
the relation between secret key rate and QBER in BB84
protocol with ideal single photon state. We find that the
maximum tolerable QBER increases to 11.37%, compar-
ing with 11% when using the GLLP method. Because
the background noises caused by the imperfect IM al-
ways exist, the QBER labeled on lateral axis does not
start at zero.
In the case of BB84 protocol with the decoy state
method, we simulate the relation between secret key rate
and transportation distance by using the key parame-
ters for QKD experiment in[23]. Fig.4 shows that in our
analysis the maximum secure transportation distance is
120.6km, comparing to 119.9km by using the previous
analysis method[16], and the secret key rates we achieved
in [23] increase 3% - 4%(see table 1) in the modification.
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FIG. 4: The simulation result of the modified secret key rate
in the case of using decoy state method. The red line describes
the optimal estimation of the secret key rate using the method
in[16] and experiment data in[23]. By considering the extra
noise introduced by the imperfect IM, the estimation of secret
key rate using the modified method in our paper which is
described in blue line. In this simulation, the extinction ratio
of IM is 27dB.
TABLE I: The secret key rates calculated by[23] and modi-
fied by this paper, in units of kbit/s. The items in the first
row denote the different communication channels of the QKD
network stated in [23].
QKD Channels A2R2B A2R2C D2R2A E2R2A
Secret key (in [23]) 4.91 2.02 1.82 0.41
Secret key (in this paper) 5.09 2.09 1.88 0.43
V. CONCLUSION
The effect of the IM extinction on practical QKD sys-
tem is analyzed in paper. We surprisingly found that
Eve loses more information than Alice and Bob in the
process of realistic intensity modulation. We improved
the lower bound of secret key rate of BB84 protocol with
ideal single photon state and decoy state method respec-
tively, and compare them to the previous security anal-
ysis in numerical simulation. Our study makes an effort
to consummate the security analysis of the realistic de-
vices in practical QKD systems. Moreover, the security
of the other realistic devices can also be analyzed by the
approach we derived in this paper.
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Appendix
Here we derive the expressions of Eq.(2) and Eq.(3) in
section 2. We analyze the case of polarization encoding,
which uses the 1 × 4 coupler described in Fig.5. The
similar analysis can be also applied to the phase encoding
case and obtains the same result.
As we have mentioned in section 2, after the random
phase modulating and encoding, the four coherent states
input to the 4×1 coupler are |eiθa√Pon µ2 〉, |eiθb
√
Poff
µ
2 〉,
|eiθc√Poff µ2 〉 and |eiθd
√
Poff
µ
2 〉, when we assume Alice
produces the H state. Let us denote α =
√
Pon
µ
2 and
β =
√
Poff
µ
2 . After combining by the polarization beam
splitters, we get two output coherent states written in
the form of creation operators acting on vacuum states:
|eiθaα〉H |eiθbβ〉V → e−α
2+β2
2
∑∞
n=0
(eiθaαa†
H
+eiθbβa†
V
)n
n! |0〉A
= e−
α2+β2
2
∑∞
n=0
(A†)n
n! |0〉A,
|eiθcβ〉+|eiθdβ〉− → e−β2
∑∞
m=0
βm(eiθca†++e
iθda†−)
m
m! |0〉B
= e−β
2 ∑∞
m=0
βm(eiθ
′
ca†
H
+eiθ
′
da†
V
)m
m! |0〉B
= e−β
2 ∑∞
m=0
(B†)m
m! |0〉B.
(13)
Where a† denotes the creation operator with the sub-
script of different polarizations. And we also define eiθ
′
c ≡
eiθc+eiθd
2 and e
iθ
′
d ≡ eiθc−eiθd2 ; A† ≡ eiθaαa†H + eiθbβa†V
and B† ≡ β(eiθ
′
ca
†
H + e
iθ
′
da
†
V ) in the above expressions.
The coherent states before inputting to the beam splitter
can be written in direct product form as follows:
e−
α2+β2
2
∑∞
n=0
(A†)n
n! |0〉A ⊗ e−β
2 ∑∞
m=0
(B†)m
m! |0〉B
= e−
α2+3β2
2
∑∞
n,m=0
(A†)n(B†)m
n!m! |00〉
(14)
At the output ports, the beam splitter transforms each
term of the above operator polynomial into:
(A†)n(B†)m
n!m! → ( 1√2 )m+n
(C†
A
+D†
A
)n(C†
B
−D†
B
)m
n!m!
= 1√
2
m+n
n!m!
∑∞
r,s=0 C
r
nC
s
m(−1)m−s
×(C†A)r(C†B)s(D†A)n−r(D†B)m−j
(15)
Where C† and D† are the operators on path C and path
D in the same form of A† or B† according to their sub-
scripts. Crn is the number of different combinations of
choosing r terms at a time from n terms.
Since we only consider the single photon state, we then
trace off the subspace of path D and just retain the op-
erators that produce single photon. Thus we derive the
5single photon state ρH at the output port as:
ρH = e
−(α2+3β2) ∑∞
m+n=1(
1√
2
m+n
n!m!
)2
×[(C1n
√
(n− 1)!
√
m!)2
×(α2 + 3β2)n−1(2β2)m(α2|H〉〈H |+ β2|V 〉〈V |)
+(C1m
√
(m− 1)!
√
n!)2
×(α2 + 3β2)n(2β2)m−1β2(|H〉〈H |+ |V 〉〈V |)]
= e−(α
2+3β2)
∑∞
m+n=1
1
2m+n [
n
n!m! (α
2 + 3β2)n(2β2)m
×( α2α2+3β2 |H〉〈H |+ β
2
α2+3β2 |V 〉〈V |)
+ mm!n! (α
2 + 3β2)n(2β2)m 12 (|H〉〈H |+ V 〉〈V |)]
= e−(α
2+3β2)
∑∞
j=1(
1
2 )
j
∑j
n=0
×{ nn!(j−n)! (α2 + 3β2)n(2β2)j−n
×[ α2−β2α2+3β2 |H〉〈H |+ 2β
2
α2+3β2
1
2 (|H〉〈H |+ |V 〉〈V |)]
+ j−nn!(j−n)! (α
2 + 3β2)n(2β2)j−n 12 (|H〉〈H |+ |V 〉〈V |)}
≈ e−(α2+3β2) ∑∞j=1(12 )j (α
2+3β2)j
(j−1)! (
α2−β2
α2+3β2 |H〉〈H |)
+
∑∞
j=1(
1
2 )
j (j−1)(α2+3β2)j−12β2
(j−1)! (
α2−β2
α2+3β2 |H〉〈H |)
+
∑∞
j=1(
1
2 )
j (α
2+3β2)j
(j−1)!
2β2
α2+3β2
Iˆ
2
+
∑∞
j=1(
1
2 )
j (α
2+3β2)j−12β2
(j−1)! [(j − 1) 2β
2
α2+3β2
Iˆ
2 +
Iˆ
2 ]
≈ e−(α2+3β2)
×∑∞j=0(12 )j+1 (α
2+3β2)j+1
j!
×[ α2−β2α2+3β2 |H〉〈H |+ 4β
2
α2+3β2
Iˆ
2 ]
= e−
α2+3β2
2 (α
2+3β2
2 )
×( α2−β2α2+3β2 |H〉〈H |+ 4β
2
α2+3β2
Iˆ
2 )
= N · ( r−1r+3 |H〉〈H |+ 4r+3ρnoise).
(16)
Where ρnoise ≡ 12 Iˆ = |H〉〈H|+|V 〉〈V |2 , N = e
α2+3β2
2 ·
α2+3β2
2 · β2 is the normalizing factor, and r = α
2
β2 equals
to the definition of extinction ratio in Eq.(1). On the
fourth step of this derivation, we make an approximation
by neglecting the terms have coefficient (2β2)i with order
higher than 1, under the assumption of β ≪ α. Ignoring
the normalizing factor, we can derive the single photon
signal state as following:
ρsignal =
r−1
r+3ρideal +
4
r+3ρnoise. (17)
It is exactly Eq.(3) in the main text.
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